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Mitchell v. Wisconsin: Warrantless Blood Tests on 
Unconscious DWI Suspects are “Almost Always” 
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
PINCHAS BALSAM*© 
 
In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court addressed whether police can obtain 
a warrantless blood sample from an unconscious driving while intoxicated (DWI) 
suspect.1 The Court held that when a DWI suspect is unconscious, the police can 
“almost always” order a blood test without obtaining a warrant.2 Nevertheless, the 
Court remanded the case to give Mitchell an opportunity to show that the police could 
have reasonably obtained a warrant in his particular case.3 The Court’s holding is 
correct because it is consistent with Court precedent and properly balanced the public 
policy need to deter drunk driving and DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment4 privacy 
rights.  
Alcohol related car collisions cause 10,000 to 20,000 fatalities per year in the 
United States.5 Accordingly, to reduce drunk driving related deaths, there is a 
“compelling need” for states to enforce DWI criminal statutes.6 To enforce DWI 
statutes, police rely on three technologies to measure the blood alcohol concentration 
(“BAC”) of DWI suspects.7  
The first technology police use to gauge BAC is the preliminary, roadside breath 
test. Generally, roadside breath tests only establish probable cause to arrest a DWI 
suspect but are insufficient evidence to obtain a DWI conviction.8 To obtain 
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 1. 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 2530. 
 3. Id. at 2539. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 5. Mitchell 139 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC 
SAFETY FACTS 2016 (May 2018)). 
 6. See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 7. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
 8. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2191 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that 
reliability concerns generally limit roadside breath tests to establishing probable cause). 
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admissible evidence of a DWI violation, police administer an evidence grade breath 
test; and that test is usually administered at a police station, where the environment 
is “conducive to reliable testing.”9 Alternatively, police can conduct a blood test to 
obtain evidence grade BAC evidence. And if the DWI suspect is unconscious, the 
police can only administer a blood test to obtain BAC evidence.10 Therefore, because 
Mitchell was unconscious, the police could only obtain DWI evidence against him 
through a blood test.  
I. THE CASE 
Petitioner Gerald Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, 
after a preliminary breath test determined that his BAC was above the legal limit.11 
Consistent with the standard practice, the police drove Mitchell to the police station 
to administer a more reliable, evidence grade breath test.12 By the time Michell 
arrived at the police station, however, he was too lethargic for a breath test. The 
police therefore drove Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test.13 When he 
arrived at the hospital, Mitchell was unconscious and could not consent to a blood 
test.14 Without Mitchell’s consent—and without obtaining a warrant—the police 
obtained a blood sample from Mitchell.15 The blood test showed that Mitchell’s BAC 
was 0.222%, above the legal limit.16  
Subsequently, the state of Wisconsin (“the State”) charged Mitchell for violating 
two provisions of the state’s DWI statute.17 At his trial, Mitchell moved to suppress 
the BAC evidence and argued that the police acquired it without a warrant and in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.18 In response, the State argued that the 
blood test was consensual because Wisconsin has an implied consent law.19 The trial 
court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress, and a jury convicted him of the charged 
offenses.20  
Michell appealed his convictions, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified 
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the following question: “[does a] warrantless blood 
 
 9. Id. at 2168 (majority opinion). 
 10. Id. at 2184. 
 11. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2532. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law,21 
where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violate[ ] the Fourth 
Amendment.22“ The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, understood the 
intermediate appellate court to be asking two questions: First, whether Wisconsin 
implied consent is constitutional consent under the Fourth Amendment. And 
secondly, “whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person pursuant 
to [the Wisconsin implied consent statute] violates the Fourth Amendment.”23 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that under the state’s implied consent law, 
Mitchell voluntarily consented to a blood test.24 Furthermore, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that by drinking to the point of unconsciousness, Mitchell 
forfeited any opportunity he had to withdraw his consent and the blood test was thus 
lawful under the Fourth Amendment.25  
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Mitchell’s petition for 
certiorari to decide whether “a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious 
motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement.”26  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To prevent drunk driving and ensure safe roads, states have laws that prohibit 
motorists from driving with BAC above a specified level.27 And to enforce DWI 
laws, states use blood test or breath test technologies to measure DWI suspects’ BAC 
and obtain evidence of drunk driving.28 Because many DWI suspects would not 
voluntarily submit to a DWI test, states have implied consent laws that mandate such 
testing. These laws present various constitutional questions and specifically raise the 
following Fourth Amendment question: how do states enforce DWI laws and 
maintain road safety without violating DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights?  
The Supreme Court has decided constitutional questions relating to the arrest and 
compulsory BAC testing of DWI suspects from as early as 1957.29 In Breithaupt v. 
Abram, the petitioner, through a writ of habeas corpus, challenged his incarceration 
for manslaughter on the grounds that the BAC evidence that supported his conviction 
 
 21. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(3)(b) (2020). 
 22. State v. Mitchell, No. 2015AP304-CR, 2017 WL 9803322 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017). 
 23. State v. Mitchell, 914 N.W. 2d 151, 155-56 (Wis. 2018), rev’d, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. 2525 
(2019). 
 24. Id. at 167. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019). 
 27. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
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was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.30 Specifically, the 
petitioner claimed that drawing his blood while he was unconscious amounted to an 
unreasonable search and seizure and violated his Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy.31 In reaching its decision, the Court underscored that blood tests are “routine 
in everyday life” and required to join the military, matriculate at a university and 
obtain a marriage license.32 The Court therefore rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that the blood test was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and held that 
even though the petitioner was unconscious, conducting a blood test neither 
“shock[ed] the conscience” nor violated “traditional ideas of fair play and 
decency.”33   
Subsequently, in Mapp v. Ohio,34 the Court held that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment was not admissible in state criminal 
prosecutions; the Court therefore re-examined the question of whether BAC blood 
tests require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, so as to not be excluded under 
Mapp.35 In Schmerber v. California, a DWI suspect was hospitalized for injuries he 
sustained in an alcohol related accident.36 At the hospital, the police obtained a blood 
sample from the suspect without a warrant and without his consent; the blood sample 
was later admitted as evidence for a DWI conviction.37 Among other constitutional 
challenges, Schmerber claimed that forcing him to undergo a blood test violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.38 The Court, however, found that even under Mapp, there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation.39 The Court explained that the police may have 
reasonably believed that proceeding with the blood test without obtaining a warrant 
was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, since “the percentage of alcohol 
in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.”40 The Court also found 
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because blood tests are 
“commonplace in these days of periodic physical examination” and therefore 
reasonable.41   
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 433-34. 
 32. Id. at 436; Id. at 439 (explaining that blood test are routine procedures “to which millions of Americans 
submit as a matter of course nearly every day.”). 
 33. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435 (relying on Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev’d Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) which held that in state prosecutions for state crimes, the exclusion of evidence obtained through 
Fourth Amendment violations is not required). 
 34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 35. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 36. Id. at 758. 
 37. Id. at 758-59. 
 38. Id. at 759. 
 39. Id. at 772. 
 40. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). 
 41. Id. at 771-72. 
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Thereafter, the Court clarified that the natural metabolization of alcohol, 
discussed in Schmerber does not create a per se exigency exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.42 In Missouri v. McNeeley, a DWI defendant 
moved to suppress the results from his BAC blood test on the grounds that the police 
obtained the evidence without his consent or a warrant and in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.43 The Court explained that even though there is the risk of 
alcohol metabolizing and BAC evidence being lost, warrantless blood tests are not 
categorically permissible under the exigency exception.44 Instead, the Court held that 
whether the exigent circumstances exception the Fourth Amendment applies must be 
determined case by case, based on the totality of the circumstances.45 
Later, in 2016, the Supreme Court addressed whether police can administer a 
breath test without obtaining warrant. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court found 
that BAC tests are searches that are governed by the Fourth Amendment.46 
Furthermore, the Court distinguished breath tests from blood tests. Specifically, the 
Court held that the “search incident to arrest” exception47 permits warrantless breath 
tests that are incidental to the arrest since breath tests do not “implicate significant 
privacy concerns.”48 And in contrast to breath tests, the Court found that blood tests 
are more intrusive because they require “piercing the skin.”49 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Court addressed whether police can obtain a 
warrantless blood sample from an unconscious DWI suspect.50 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Alito held that when a DWI suspect is unconscious, police can 
“almost always” obtain a blood sample without first obtaining a warrant.51 The Court 
 
 42. Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013). 
 43. Id. at 146. 
 44. Id. at 152-153 (explaining that a categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to 
conduct a blood test is not necessary; because BAC evidence dissipates over a gradual and predictable timeframe 
and since the police need to transport a DWI suspect to a medical facility to obtain a blood sample, in some cases, 
there is time to obtain a warrant). 
 45. Id. at 145. 
 46. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016). 
 47. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (explaining that the search incident to arrest 
exception to the Fourth Amendment permits police to search an arrestee and the area within his immediate 
control). 
 48. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78 (explaining breath tests involve a “negligible physical intrusion” and 
“minimum inconvenience.”); Id. (reasoning that breath tests are less intrusive because they are only capable of 
providing BAC information.). 
 49. Id. (noting that a blood test is more intrusive than a breath test because it places in the hands of law 
enforcement a sample from which it is possible to extract information beyond BAC information.). 
 50. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019). 
 51. Id. at 2530. 
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first outlined previous aspects of DWI laws that the Court upheld as constitutional.52 
The Court then underscored the policy need to enforce BAC limitations and thereby 
save lives.53 Next, the Court explained the exigent circumstances exception to the 
Fourth Amendment and the Court’s prior jurisprudence on the scope of the exigency 
exception.54 Finally, applying Court precedent, the Court concluded that the exigent 
circumstances exception applies in “almost all” situations in which a DWI suspect is 
unconscious.55  
The Court first explained its previous decisions on whether state DWI laws that 
mandate BAC testing violate the Fourth Amendment.56 The Court began by 
underscoring that BAC tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment.57 And 
because BAC tests are Fourth Amendment searches, warrantless BAC tests are only 
constitutional when an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
exists.58 Under this constitutional framework, the Court explained that it previously 
held that the search incident to the arrest exception permits warrantless breath tests 
on DWI suspects.59 The Court further noted that it previously held that the exigent 
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permits police to conduct a 
warrantless blood test if the police reasonably believe that delaying a blood test to 
obtain a warrant would lead to the destruction of evidence.60 Finally, the Court 
explained that the natural metabolization of BAC evidence does not categorically 
establish an exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment.61 
The Court also underscored the public policy need to enforce BAC limitations. 
The Court explained that BAC tests are necessary to save lives because drunk driving 
kills between 10,000 and 20,000 Americans annually.62 To ensure highway safety, 
states must prohibit motorists from driving with BAC levels above a set limit and 
 
 52. Id. at 2532-35. 
 53. Id. at 2535-37. 
 54. Id. at 2537-38. 
 55. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2538-39. 
 56. Id. at 2532-35. 
 57. Id. at 2533. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185). 
 60. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). In Schmerber, the police had to 
investigate an accident and transport the DWI suspect to a hospital which led the Court to conclude that the police 
did not have time to obtain a warrant. 384 US at 770-71. 
 61. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013)). 
 62. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct at 2535-36 (noting that The Court had “strained [its] vocal cords to give adequate 
expression” to the public interest of having safe roads); See e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) 
(explaining that the states have a “paramount” interest in preserving road safety); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439 
(comparing drunk driving to “slaughter” taking place on “battlefields”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 
558 (1983) (describing preventable accidents as “tragic” and blaming drunk drivers for “carnage”); Tate v. Short, 
401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackman, J., concurring) (explaining that irresponsible driving can cause “frightful 
carnage”). 
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enforce the BAC limitations through BAC tests.63 BAC tests, according to the Court, 
seem to make a big difference in reducing drunk driving deaths; as states enacted 
stricter BAC limitations, DWI deaths decreased.64 Accordingly, the Court concluded, 
accurate BAC tests are a necessary measure to deter drunk driving and, specifically, 
blood tests are necessary when a DWI suspect is unconscious and unable to take a 
breath test.65  
After explaining the policy need to enforce BAC limitations, the Court outlined 
its jurisprudence on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court first explained that Schmerber established that the police can conduct 
warrantless blood tests under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, if the police reasonably believe that there is not sufficient time to obtain 
a warrant.66 The Court then concluded that like the car accident in Schmerber, 
Mitchell’s unconsciousness created “pressing needs” that may have precluded the 
police from obtaining a warrant.67 Additionally, the Court held that Mitchell’s 
unconsciousness distinguishes his case from McNeely, an “uncomplicated drunk 
driving scenario” in which there was no exigent circumstances exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.68   
The Court held that the police can “almost always” obtain a warrantless blood 
sample from an unconscious DWI suspect.69 The Court, however, did not rule out 
the unusual possibility of an unconscious DWI suspect demonstrating that the police 
could not have reasonably believed that obtaining a warrant would have interfered 
with other pressing needs or duties.70 Therefore, the Court remanded the case to give 
Mitchell an opportunity to make such a showing.71   
 
 63. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535. 
 64. Id. at 2536. 
 65. Id. at 2537 (noting that there is an even greater need to conduct a BAC test on an unconscious DWI 
suspect because such a suspect poses a greater danger to the public and doing otherwise, would be “perverse” 
and a reward for “wanton behavior.”). 
 66. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Schmerber 384 U.S. at 770). The Court explained that an exigency 
exists when BAC evidence is metabolizing and some other factor “creates pressing health, safety, or law 
enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application.” Mitchell, 139 S. Ct at 2537. 
 67. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537-39 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770) (explaining that an unconscious DWI 
suspect will need to be transported to a hospital for urgent medical treatment and the medical treatment might 
delay a blood test and thus reduce its evidentiary value); Id. (noting that in many drunk driving cases in which 
the driver is unconscious, there is also an accident that further compounds the exigency); Id. at 2538. 
 68. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (distinguishing McNeely). 
 69. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas concluded that the plurality’s rule will 
be difficult to apply.72 Justice Thomas stated that the Court should have held that the 
natural metabolization of alcohol creates a per se exigent circumstances exception 
that allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI 
suspect.73 According to Justice Thomas, the natural metabolization of alcohol is 
always an exigency because the penalty for drunk driving depends on obtaining 
evidence of the suspect’s BAC.74 Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the plurality is 
presumably creating a difficult to apply rule to avoid overturning McNeely.75  
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor rejected the plurality’s rule and characterized it 
as “a presumption of exigent circumstances that Wisconsin does not urge.”76 Justice 
Sotomayor explained that under Schmerber, there is no categorical exception that 
permits warrantless blood tests.77 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor rejects the 
plurality opinion because it relies on the exigent circumstances exception that 
Wisconsin never raised.78 And according to Justice Sotomayor, Wisconsin could not 
have argued for the exigent circumstances exception because police do not conduct 
blood tests at the arrest scene; rather, the police must first drive the suspect to a 
medical facility and that delay may provide time for the police to obtain a warrant.79 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor explained that in the case of an unconscious DWI suspect, 
there should not be a categorical exception to the warrant requirement because the 
suspect’s BAC dissipates gradually and predictably and there is a guaranteed delay 
in administering a blood test because the suspect must first be transported to a 
medical facility.80 Therefore, according to Justice Sotomayor, to obtain a blood 
sample from an unconscious DWI suspect, the police need to obtain a warrant “if 
possible” and there is no presumption that the police can “almost always” order a 
warrantless blood test.81 
 
 72. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reasoning that the difficult rule will “rarely be 
rebutted” but will burden those attempting to apply it). 
 73. Id. (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)). 
 74. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2540-41 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 2541 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that in contrast to the plurality’s reluctance to overturn 
McNeely, that case was wrongly decided and should be overturned). 
 76. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 2544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 2545-46 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that there were no facts in the record that justified 
the Court’s presumption that exigent circumstances “most likely” existed). 
 79. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2546-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that technological advancements 
enable “more expeditious processing of warrant applications.”); Id. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 
McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154). Specifically, in many states, police can apply for warrants remotely, through email, 
telephone, radio, or video conferencing communications. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154). 
 80. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2549 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 2550-51 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch stated that he “would have dismissed this case as 
improvidently granted.”82 Justice Gorsuch explained that the Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether Wisconsin drivers “impliedly consented” to a warrantless blood 
test.83 While Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that the Court can reach its conclusion 
based on “any reason supported in the record,” he believed that applying the exigent 
circumstances in this case involved “complex questions” that could be better 
resolved at the courts below.84 Therefore, Justice Gorsuch did not accept the Court’s 
conclusion that the police can “almost always” order a blood test on an unconscious 
DWI suspect.85  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood 
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is correct because it is consistent with Court 
precedent on that issue. First, in Breithaupt, the Court held that blood tests are 
“routine in everyday life.”86 Additionally, the Court found that blood tests neither 
“shock the conscience” nor violate “traditional ideas of fair play and decency.”87 The 
Court therefore found that a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.88 Accordingly, the Court’s holding that the 
police can “almost always” conduct a warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI 
suspect is consistent with the Court’s holding in Breithaupt that allowed a 
warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect.89 
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood 
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is also consistent with Schmerber. In Schmerber, 
the Court reemphasized that blood tests are “common place in these days of periodic 
physical examination”90 and held that warrantless blood tests are constitutional in 
situations in which the police could reasonably believe that a warrantless blood test 
was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.91 Likewise, in this case, since 
the police had to investigate the accident and transport Mitchell to a hospital, the 
police could have reasonably believed a warrantless blood test on Mitchell was 
necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.92 Therefore, the Court’s conclusion 
 
 82. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2551 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 86. 352 U.S. at 436. 
 87. Id. at 435-37 
 88. Id. at 439-40. 
 89. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-40 (1957). 
 90. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). 
 91. Id. at 770. 
 92. See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2532. 
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that a warrantless blood test on Mitchell was most likely constitutional is consistent 
with the Court’s holding in Schmerber.  
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood 
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is consistent with McNeely. In McNeely, the 
Court held that the natural metabolization of alcohol and BAC evidence does not 
create a per se exigent circumstances exception to permit a warrantless blood test.93 
Rather, the Court held that whether exigent circumstances exist depends on the 
“totality of the circumstances” and the facts of the case.94 In this case, the Court did 
not categorically permit warrantless blood tests on unconscious DWI suspects.95 
Instead, the Court acknowledged that Mitchell might be able to prove that the police 
could not have reasonably believed that obtaining a warrant would have led to the 
destruction of BAC evidence; and the Court remanded the case to provide Mitchell 
an opportunity to make such a showing.96 Accordingly, since the Court did not 
categorically permit warrantless blood tests in cases of unconscious DWI suspects, 
the Court’s conclusion is consistent with McNeely.  
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood 
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is likewise consistent with Birchfield. In 
Birchfield, the Court held that blood tests are more intrusive than breath tests and are 
therefore not categorically permitted without a warrant.97 However, the Court did not 
conclude that warrants are categorically required to conduct a blood test on every 
DWI suspect. To the contrary, the Court acknowledged that blood tests are necessary 
when the DWI suspect is unconscious and police “may apply for a warrant if need 
be.”98 The Court did not conclude in Birchfield that a warrant is categorically required 
to conduct a blood test on a DWI suspect, so accordingly, the Court’s conclusion is 
consistent with Birchfield. Because the Court’s conclusion in Mitchell is consistent 
with the Court’s jurisprudence regarding administering blood tests to DWI suspects, 
the Court’s decision is correct.   
The Court’s conclusion that police can “almost always” order a warrantless blood 
test on an unconscious DWI suspect is correct because the Court properly balanced 
the compelling public policy need to deter drunk driving and the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights. As the Court pointed out, alcohol related car collisions 
cause 10,000 to 20,000 fatalities per year and there is therefore a “vital public 
 
 93. Missouri v. McNeeley, 569 U.S. 141, 152 (2013). 
 94. Id. at 145. 
 95. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2539. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 136 S. Ct. at 2185. 
 98. Id. (stating that “if need be” implies that the police do not always need a warrant in such a situation and 
regular Fourth Amendment exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, apply). 
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interest” for states to enforce DWI criminal statutes.99 Hence, the Court has “strained 
[its] vocal cords to give adequate expression to the stakes.”100  
Drunk driving substantially increases the risk of a motor vehicle accident.101 For 
example, an increase of BAC of 0.02 percent doubles the relative risk of a motor 
vehicle crash among 16- to 20-year old males, and the risk of an accident increases 
to nearly 52 times when a driver’s BAC is between 0.08 percent and 0.10 percent, 
the legal limits in many states.102 The increased risk occurs because alcohol 
negatively affects brain function.103  
Drunk driving accidents also impose substantial economic harm. For example, in 
2010, deaths and damages from DWIs costed 44 billion dollars.104 And for each DWI 
incident, “the externality imposed on society . . . may be as high as $8,000.”105 
Accordingly, to protect the public from the dangers and economic harms posed by 
drunk driving, states have a compelling interest in enforcing DWI criminal statutes. 
To enforce DWI criminal statutes, states need to obtain blood samples from 
unconscious motorists. As the Supreme Court held in Mackey v. Montrym, effective 
enforcement of impaired driving laws is required for the laws to operate as a 
“deterrent” and remove intoxicated drivers from the road.106 Put differently, the 
Court has stated that “no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken 
driving problem or the states’ interest in eradicating it.”107  
In addition to discouraging drunk driving, states have a compelling need to obtain 
blood samples from unconscious drivers to deter motorists from driving while under 
the influence of drugs.108 Between 2006 and 2016, the number of fatally injured 
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drivers who tested positive for drugs rose from 27.8 percent to 43.6 percent.109 Drug 
impaired drivers cause approximately 20 percent of car crashes, which translates into 
8,600 deaths, 580,000 injuries, and $33 billion in property damage each year in the 
United States.110 In particular, marijuana impaired driving is an increasing problem. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 13 percent of nighttime 
and weekend drivers have marijuana in their system.111 Drug impaired drivers are 
often unconscious, and to determine whether these motorists are under the influence 
of drugs, blood draws are required because breath tests cannot detect narcotics.112  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that states have a compelling 
interest in preventing drunk driving. In Breithaupt, the Court compared DWI related 
deaths to “slaughter” on “battlefields” and underscored the need to discourage drunk 
driving by enforcing BAC limits.113 Similarly, in McNeely, the Court discussed the 
“compelling governmental need” to deter drunk driving.114 In South Dakota v. 
Neville, the Court attributed “carnage” to drunk driving.115 And in Birchfield, the 
Court explained that States have a “paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety 
of . . . public highways” and “in creating effective deterrent[s] to drunken driving.”116  
The Court correctly balanced unconscious DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights and the compelling public policy need to deter drunk driving. The 
litmus test for whether a police search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment 
is whether the search is reasonable–based on the totality of the circumstances.117 And 
the reasonableness of a search is determined by “assessing, on the one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree 
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”118 
Blood draws from unconscious drivers are reasonable police searches and 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Police cannot administer warrantless blood 
tests on DWI suspects in every scenario. Rather, DWI enforcement laws are 
governed like other Fourth Amendment situations in which exceptions to the warrant 
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requirement may or may not apply, depending on the case.119 One exception to the 
Fourth Amendment is the exigent circumstances exception.120 And as the Court 
concluded in McNeely, determining whether an exigency exists depends on the 
“totality of the circumstances” and the facts of the case.121 Regarding unconscious 
DWI suspects, the Court did not conclude that the police can always conduct a 
warrantless blood test based on the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.122 Instead, the Court held that DWI suspects must be given a chance to 
show that the police could have obtained a warrant.123 Therefore, because the Court 
did not establish a categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement—but instead relied on the reasonable and well-established exigent 
circumstances exception—the Court’s conclusion is consistent with DWI suspects’ 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the Court held that police can “almost always” order a 
warrantless blood test on an unconscious DWI suspect.124 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court underscored the important public policy need to maintain road 
safety by enforcing DWI criminal statutes that deter drunk driving.125 Furthermore, 
the Court explained its prior jurisprudence on the exigent circumstances exception to 
the Fourth Amendment126 and explained why the exigency exception “almost 
always” permits a warrantless blood test in the case of an unconscious DWI 
suspect.127 The Court’s decision was correct because it is consistent with Court 
precedent and properly balanced the compelling public policy need to deter drunk 
driving and unconscious DWI suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights.128 
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